SELLING YOUR TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS
LESSONS FROM DEALS GONE AWRY

By Gavin G. Galimi, Attorney, Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP

Every lawyer can talk about the deals that closed. If you are selling your technology business, you should be asking about the deals that went bust or were renegotiated. Why did they go bust? How did the deal terms change? What could have been done differently? Some of these stories, and the lessons they teach, are told here.

Romeo and Juliet
Think Montague and Capulet and the tragedy of Romeo and Juliet. In this story, there are two companies, "Buyer" and "Seller." Buyer and Seller are fierce competitors. They sell into the same space and in the same territory. The competition is so fierce that at virtually every staff and management meeting, Seller bad mouths Buyer. For years, Seller has been telling its people how terrible and how weak the Buyer is, how buggy Buyer's software is, and how Buyer's development team rejects end up at Seller.

The chief executives of Buyer and Seller begin discussions about a possible deal. Notwithstanding the perception of Seller's rank and file that everything about Buyer is terrible, Buyer's acquisition of Seller makes a great deal of sense. Seller's development pipeline is very attractive. Seller is much further down the path than Buyer of finishing the next generation product. As a combined company, Buyer could cut its development expenditures and still speed the next generation product to market. The combined sales force would be the largest in the industry and the combined company would be nearly ten times larger (based on revenue) than its nearest competitor. (Some of you may be thinking there are antitrust issues involved, but that is not what this article is about.)

Negotiations go very well. Although there is some back and forth over price and various asset purchase agreement provisions, all of the deal terms get ironed out. The CEOs of both companies, with approvals from their boards of directors, sign the purchase agreement. Both executives now turn their focus to satisfying closing conditions. Since a key motivating factor for the acquisition is the development pipeline at Seller, one of those conditions is that the development team must agree to join Seller after the acquisition. Although the Buyer can waive any condition that is not satisfied and proceed with the closing, there really is no deal if this condition is not met.

You may have guessed where this story goes. There is no way Seller's development team will join Buyer. For years, this team was either ranting about, or listening to rants about, how horrible and inferior Buyer was. Although generous retention packages were offered to the development team, the culture of competition - the great feud between the Montagues and Capulets - stopped this deal from getting done.

Buyer learned two lessons from this dead transaction. First, examine carefully the culture of the target company. Second, be thoughtful about the internal messages conveyed to the workforce about competitors, anticipating the day the buyer becomes a seller.

Woops, Someone Else Owns What You Are Selling
There are many news articles about two companies involved in a lawsuit over intellectual property ownership. These are what we will call "Woops Problems." The story behind Woops Problems invariably involves some variation on the theme that the product your company is selling allegedly incorporates technology developed and owned by another person or company.

A real example was reported in the April 4, 2005 Orange County Business Journal. Computer Associates International Inc. alleged that Quest Software Inc. was selling software that included code from a company Computer Associates had purchased a few years previously. Allegedly, four workers from the acquired company went to work at Quest after the acquisition and supposedly used or incorporated the original code from the acquired company into software being sold by Quest. A lawsuit followed and a court enjoined Quest from selling certain products which allegedly included the original code from Computer Associates. Quest and Computer Associates subsequently settled, with neither side admitting any fault. As part of the settlement, Quest was to pay Computer Associates $16 million plus royalties for a non-exclusive license to the code in dispute.

In an acquisition, when the potential problem with a target company is so obvious because there is already a lawsuit, either the acquisition never happens or a substantial price reduction occurs to ensure that the substantial, anticipated expenses of the litigation are deducted from the value the business was thought to have without the litigation.

More typically, there is no active lawsuit and the buyers depend on diligence and the purchase agreement's representations, warranties, and indemnities for protection from the Woops Problem. Can the selling company represent to the buyer that all employees, or at least all key employees, have entered into confidentiality and proprietary rights agreements with the company in a form that is satisfactory to the buyer? If not, deals involving significant intellectual property often fall apart, considering the potential liability to the buyer easily can run into the millions of dollars.

Another scenario typical of a Woops Problem revolves around companies that are founded in one state, but then move or expand into other states. The risk centers on whether the documents that worked in one state work in the other states.
In this story, a company had moved to California a few years ago from a mid-Atlantic state. Because of changes in the industry, the Company was now looking to be sold. Much of the company's value was based on technology relying upon algorithms developed by employees who had moved with the Company to California. Potential buyers who understood the business were anxious to conduct diligence on the ownership of the company's technology.

In the course of that diligence, the buyers discovered that an early form of confidentiality and proprietary rights agreement from the original founding state was still in use. There were two big problems with the form. It prohibited competition after employment terminated in violation of California law and the form omitted provisions on invention assignment required by California law.

While a few potential buyers ceased to be interested in the company, one continued with diligence. This prospective buyer and the sellers were able to get comfortable that this issue was manageable with respect to the existing workforce. A number of former employees who were instrumental in developing the algorithms had left the company on less than favorable terms.

This story does ultimately end with a sale. In this case, the key people among the former employees were paid a hefty sum to enter into agreements that cleaned up the intellectual property ownership issues and extensive indemnity and escrow protections were implemented to get the buyer comfortable with the remaining risk. The sale closed nine months later than had been planned and the sellers ended up with several million dollars less, after netting the payments and additional costs involved with cleaning up the Woops Problem, than originally had been agreed.

Uncle Sam Takes His Cut - Taxes
A business school professor once asked his class how many people wanted to write a check to the federal government for $3.5 million in taxes. Most people have a knee-jerk reaction at the thought of paying taxes, especially a seven figure number. As a result, very few students raised their hands. The professor asked one of the students who had raised her hand to explain why she wanted to write the check.

She explained, "Assuming an ordinary income tax rate of 35% and that the check being written is to pay ordinary income tax, I would have earned $10 million if I owed $3.5 million in taxes."

Another student was even happier about writing the check. "I'd be even happier writing a $3.5 million check to the IRS if it was for capital gains. Assuming a 15% long-term capital gains tax rate, I would have earned $23.3 million to owe that much in taxes."

Managing tax exposure can greatly enhance the amount of money a seller gets to keep from a sale transaction. Volumes have been written about tax planning. Because of the tax rate difference, long-term capital gains are worth 20% more than ordinary income. One of the most common ways for a seller to have long-term capital gains treatment for a sale transaction is for a stockholder to sell the stock of a "C" corporation owned by the stockholder for more than one year. A stock sale, besides affording the buyer little opportunity to avoid the liabilities of the seller, also deprives the seller of the ability to take a tax deduction for the amount of money paid for the stock. This is in contrast to an asset sale in which the buyer gets a deduction for the amount paid for the assets and the buyer generally picks and chooses which liabilities to assume. The seller's tax treatment for an asset sale depends on the assets being sold, the seller's basis in those assets, and type of entity holding the assets. If the seller is a "C" corporation, an asset sale results in two levels of tax: first, the gain on each asset is taxable income to the seller and second, the corporation's distribution of net, after tax proceeds, is taxed at the stockholder's level.

All this is background for the story of a deal gone awry. The seller had received several proposals to buy the business. Some of the proposals were asset deals, one was a stock deal. The stock purchase proposal was for about $10 million. After taxes, this was roughly the equivalent of $8.5 million to the seller. The asset purchase proposals were in the range of $20 million. After taxes, this was roughly $11 million to the seller.

The seller was very discontented that an offer that was 200% larger resulted in net proceeds after taxes only 30% larger. Like many sellers with multiple offers, this seller began combining the pro-seller features from each of the offers into a counteroffer. The new deal terms would be $20 million in a stock deal, leaving the seller with roughly $17 million after taxes.

This counteroffer was very expensive to the potential buyers. The proposed stock buyer was being asked to double his bid. The proposed asset buyers had lost the liability limitations of an asset sale, and because they would lose the deduction for the amounts paid for the assets, would end up paying roughly $7 million more, after taxes, for the business in a stock deal.

At this point, the deal was dead. The asking price had gone up, on an after-tax basis, at least $7 million. This was just too rich a price for the proposed buyers. In this case, taxes and perhaps a little greed, had killed the deal.

The seller quickly learned to bring the tax advisors together much sooner in a potential transaction. He also implemented on this strategy very quickly. After the hype over the counter-proposal died down, the seller put his tax advisors together with those of some of the buyers. After some thoughtful planning over several months, the seller and a buyer were able to restructure the transaction so net, after tax-proceeds to seller totaled approximately $15 million.

So please, when you are looking to sell your technology business, do not let Uncle Sam, Romeo and Juliet, or a Woops Problem stand in your way.

Gavin G. Galimi is an experienced corporate, technology, and healthcare attorney who works extensively with companies across all industries, including software, hardware, internet, search, healthcare, and biotechnology. An entrepreneur himself, he focuses his practice on helping entrepreneurs of large, middle market, and emerging companies achieve their business objectives, including venture financings, mergers, acquisitions, inbound and outbound licensing transactions, and advising on operational matters. He also advises clients on privacy and data security matters. Gavin can be reached in the Los Angeles office of Katten Muchin Rosenman, LLP, an AmLaw Global 100 and BTI Top 30 Client Service law firm. Please feel free to share your comments and thoughts. His email is gavin.galimi@kattenlaw.com.

© 2006 by Gavin G. Galimi. This article is not to be construed as legal or tax advice. CIRCULAR 230 DISCLOSURE: Pursuant to regulations governing practice before the Internal Revenue Service, any tax advice contained herein is not intended or written to be used and cannot be used by a taxpayer for the purpose of avoiding tax penalties that may be imposed on the taxpayer.

 

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